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Introduction 
Implementation of a decentralisation system, post 1998 Reformation, has brought a 
fundamental change in institutional arrangements between central and local government 
in Indonesia. Coming into force in 2001, Indonesia’s decentralisation system mainly 
consists of (1) political decentralisation, which is devolution of political power to local 
governments to manage all government’s functions except foreign affairs, security and 
defence, monetary and fiscal policy, religious affairs and justice; and (2) fiscal 
decentralisation, which mainly refers to granting authority to local governments to raise 
local taxes and providing equalisation funds which are aimed to finance the 
implementation of devolved power in local level (Pepinsky & Wihardja 2011, p. 338). 
Despite its success story to foster local development and economic growth in Indonesia 
(Aisyah 2007, p. 34; Jumadi et al. 2013, pp. 4-6), decentralisation has also been regarded 
as one of the responsible factors in the growing number of corruption cases in local areas 
(Rinaldi et al. 2007, pp. 17-18).  
According to Commission Eradication Corruption’s data, there were 361 cases of 
corruption which involved local leaders such as governor (18 cases) and mayor/regent 
(343 cases) during the period of 2004 to 2016, or in the other words, about 70 percent of 
all local leaders were convicted of corruption (Hidayatullah 2016). On the other hand, in 
examining a fraud behaviour in a firm, organisation or a system, Cressey (1973) identifies 
three determinant factors, also known as the fraud triangle, that must coexist with namely 
perceived pressure, perceived opportunity and rationalisation. DFAT (2016) argues that 
corruption or abuse of position is a narrower scope of fraud (pp. 5-6). Against this 
background, this paper analyses the rising corruption phenomena at local level in 
Indonesia’s decentralisation system from the perspective of fraud triangle. This paper 
argues that decentralisation systematically shapes pressure and creates opportunity for the 
emergence of corruption in Indonesia, while growing corruption cases and a corrupt 
justice system become two strong rationalisation factors towards corrupt behaviour. 
Analytical framework 
There have been continuing debates in relation between decentralization and corruption. 
Some scholars argue that because decentralization bring the government closer to the 
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citizens, therefore citizens’ control towards local government would be followed by 
increasing quality of governance and decreasing opportunity of corrupt behaviour from 
local leaders and local bureaucracy (Huther & Shah 1998, pp. 17-18; Arikan 2004, p. 
192). On the other hand, the others reveal evidence that decentralization is followed by 
growing corruption as potential misused of devolved power by local leader is greater 
along with a higher degree of decentralized authority and power (Fan et al. 2009, p. 14;  
Asthana 2012, p. 36). In this paper, definition of corruption would be taken from Law 
No. 31/1999 on Eradication of the Criminal Act of Corruption which defines corruption 
as any illegal acts including bribery, gratuities, act of cheating, embezzlement by abusing 
power, extortion by public servants and conflict of interest in a procurement process 
which are intended to enrich oneself or another person or a corporation, thereby creating 
losses to the state finance or state economy (Article 2; Article 5-13). 
Generally, corruption is a part of fraud in which these two activities are triggered by 
dishonesty (DFAT 2016, p. 5), therefore it is possible to apply fraud triangle in analysing 
corrupt behaviour. Byars (2009) argues that the triangle of fraud which consists of (1) 
perceived pressure, (2) perceived opportunity and (3) rationalisation are also relevant to 
adequately explain the possibility of corrupt behaviour because corruption is likely to 
occur if there were motivation or incentives or pressure, opportunity and reasonable 
excuse to justify the acts (pp. 1-2). Furthermore, examining behavioural perspective of 
corruption in Indonesia by using a fraud triangle framework, Prabowo (2014) concludes 
that the fraud triangle could be an assessment tool to assess costs and benefits before an 
offender commits corruption (p. 306). Even though the author did not specifically discuss 
corruption in the context of decentralisation, Prabowo (2014) highlights the role of 
decentralisation system in creating pressure for local officials to be corrupt (pp. 313-314). 
Other research on corruption in Indonesia’s decentralisation system was conducted by 
Kirana (2014) which mainly reveals the rising opportunity of corruption and abuse of 
power caused by devolution of power to local governments (p. 46). 
Compared to the other factors of fraud triangle, the factor of pressure felt by the 
perpetrators is the stimulus and motivation for corruption to occur, and therefore it 
becomes the most difficult factor to be prevented (Cressey 1973, p, 77). According to 
Dorminey et al (2012), a combination of (1) internal problem such as financial shortfalls, 
greed and life style as well as (2) a strong desire to retain ego and pride would heavily 
put a non-shareable, usually financial, pressure for corrupt perpetrators (p. 558). 
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Furthermore, Cressey (1973) argues that perpetrator’s comprehension towards any 
weakness that exist within an organisation or system, such as poor internal control or 
weak supervision, would be able to transform pressure to become an opportunity for 
corruption (pp. 77-78). However, both pressure and opportunity factors are not 
necessarily to be real, such a perception could lead to corrupt conduct (ibid, p. 30).  
Moreover, rationalisation is the last factor to complete the triangle. Perpetrators often 
realise that their misconducts are inappropriate, and therefore they try to create a 
justification that could be made before or after their action (Cressey 1973, p. 94). 
According to Dorminey et al. (2012), the perpetrators are usually aware that their 
misconducts are morally unacceptable, and rationalisation become an excuse to morally 
defend their action (p. 558). Rationalisation is also about economic calculations by the 
individuals involved in the activity in which decision to be corrupt is made only if the 
benefits are greater than moral cost and the possibility of getting caught (Klitgaard 2008, 
p. 3).  
Analysis 
(1) Perceived pressure 
Indonesia’s decentralisation system creates financial pressure to local leaders through 
political cost that must be spent in the process of direct election. One of embedded 
characteristics of the decentralisation system in Indonesia as regulated by Law 32/2004 
on Local Government is direct election of local leaders, replacing the previous system in 
which the local leaders were elected by local parliament (Article 24). Even though this 
process fosters democracy at local level by letting citizens to directly vote their leader 
and strengthening checks and balances mechanism between local executive and 
legislative, it raises two successive issues of: (1) money politics in the election process, 
and (2) corruption by elected local leaders. According to Muhtadi (2015), the 
phenomenon of money politics through the distribution of financial and non-financial 
benefits to obtain political and voting support from the voters has become a major issue 
in Indonesia, which mainly caused by unfair competition between candidates and voters’ 
perception that money politics is a reasonable practice to gain their votes. The voters’ 
acceptance towards money politics in a direct election system could be justified by the 
reason that Indonesia’s democracy is relatively young (Sjahrir et al. 2014, p. 167).    
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Furthermore, the political costs which have been spent by candidates in the elections in 
turn create an incentive for corrupt behaviour once they hold the position as governor, 
mayor or regent which is aimed to recovery that costs. According to Cressey (1973), an 
offender would realise a pressure and immediately become the felonious intent in fraud 
behaviour after possessing a position (p. 20). A study conducted by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs of Indonesia reveals that election costs of an elected candidate for mayor or regent 
are equivalent to AU$ 3 million and AU$ 10 million for governor (KPK 2016, p. 3). 
Considering that current monthly salary of mayor/regent is only AU$ 5,000 and AU$ 
8,000 for governor (Akuntono 2015), it is almost not possible to recover these costs over 
a five-year term.  
In addition, the high cost of election would also require private sectors’ contribution to 
finance the campaign and other election costs. Thompson (2013) defines any benefits or 
contributions which are received and used by candidates in the political process as 
political gain (p. 9). Even though the General Elections Commissions Regulation Number 
8 Year 2015 legally allows the private sector, both individuals and legal entities, to 
financially support a candidate by a maximum of AU$ 5,000 for individual and AU$ 
50,000 for a legal entity, it would be difficult for elected local leaders to avoid the 
reciprocal actions towards those contributors (Article 7). According to Rose-Ackerman 
(1999), limiting campaign funding by the private sector in a high cost election system 
will only result in increasing illegal and unreported donation (p. 370). Hence, it risks the 
local government’s policy of being captured by the contributors’ interests. Once the 
elected leaders exercise their authority that undermines the legal procedures in favour to 
contributors’ interest, political gain has been transformed into political corruption 
(Thompson 2013, p. 9).  
For instance, a study conducted by Indonesia Corruption Watch in two regencies, namely 
Ketapang and Kutai Barat in Kalimantan, reveals evidence that the patronage system 
exists to serve the interests of private companies and individuals who have contributed in 
financing the regents during the elections (Sjafrina et al. 2013, pp. 17-19).  Regent of the 
two regencies are suspected of providing excessive land use permits for coal mining and 
palm oil plantations limited to companies which has provided political gain for the 
regents, and for some permits, the regents abuse their power (ibid). This case could be an 
evidence of how local policies are being captured by private interests as a result of 
unavoidable pressure experienced by local leaders.  
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(2) Perceived opportunity 
Under Indonesia’s decentralisation system, perceived opportunity to undertake corruption 
is mainly raised by the design of regulations that arrange the system itself. Law 32/2004 
on Local Government as the main regulation to decentralisation in Indonesia devolved all 
governmental affairs and authorities, except foreign affairs, security and defence, 
monetary and fiscal policy, religious affairs and justice, to local government (Article 10). 
The wide-range of devolved authority received by local leaders would create a monopoly 
towards these authorities at local level, even though Law 32/2004 also states that there is 
a local parliament which serves as legislative and partner in checks and balances 
mechanism. According to Klitgaard (2008), the opportunity to commit corruption is 
mainly shaped when a person or a group holds a monopoly of power as a result of the 
system failure to arrange a power sharing mechanism (p. 3). Therefore, to be able to 
exploit a condition in the system to become an opportunity to commit corruption, a 
perpetrator should have the capability to undermine the control mechanism (Wolfe & 
Hermanson 2004, p. 40). 
Such a collusion between local leaders and local parliament would worsen corruption in 
local areas since monopoly held by these two bodies ceases control mechanism which 
was arranged by laws. According to Novoselov (2007), collusion could eliminate the 
benefits of control mechanism which was designed within a system (p. 8). Local 
parliament could potentially be corrupt as it is also a product of direct election and has 
the similar pressure as local leaders to recover the costs of the election. Knowing that 
local parliament members also have potential of financial pressure, providing bribes to 
parliament members to arrange a collusion between parliament and the executive would 
create opportunity for sustaining parliament’s support towards corrupt activities in the 
executive’s side. Because parliament members should act collectively in any decision 
making, local parliament members dominate the number of local officials who involved 
in corruption cases. According to the Ministry of Home Affairs’ data, 3169 local 
parliament members were convicted for corruption during the period of 2005 to 2014, 
compared to 318 of local leaders during the same period (Angga 2014; Rachman 2014). 
A famous scandal of collusion between Governor of North Sumatera Gatot Pujo Nugroho 
and local parliament members in 2014 budget discussion process could be an example of 
how executive bribes the parliament to gain support and legitimacy for a corrupt activity. 
In 2013, the Governor prepared a draft of the 2014 budget, which allegedly contained 
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several fictitious projects (Hidayat 2016). In gaining support and approval from 
parliament as an institution, the Governor has bribed all 100 parliament members by a 
total of AU$ 5 million bribe (ibid). On November 2015, KPK revealed this case and 
arrested the Governor along with 13 members of parliament. Currently, five of them have 
been sentenced to four years in prison while the governor and the rest of the suspects are 
still in the trial process (Gabrillin 2016a). This case indicates that collusion between local 
parliament and executive exists in decentralisation system. It impedes the checks and 
balances mechanism, creates a sharing monopoly of power between two institutions and 
subsequently, leads to a greater opportunity of corruption in local areas.   
Another opportunity is raised by a gap in accountability mechanism between local 
governments and the Supreme Audit Board, hereafter BPK or Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan. A weakness in accountability mechanism would lead to greater opportunity 
of corruption because this factor works as a counterbalance towards monopoly of power 
and discretion in Klitgaard’s (1998) corruption formula:  C = M + D – A, or corruption 
equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability (p. 4). According to the Law 
32/2004 on Local Government, local governments have to submit a financial statement 
to BPK not more than six months after the end of a budget year (Article 184). Opportunity 
for corruption arises as if the BPK found losses to the state finance during the audit 
process, the findings cannot be directly reported to law enforcement agencies as 
corruption cases. The finding will be considered to have been completed if the local 
governments have returned the losses to the state finance within 60 days after the 
completion of the audit, and therefore it would not affect the BPK’s opinion on the 
financial statements (Article 23 of Law 15/2004 on The State Financial Management and 
Accountability). This regulation would potentially encourage the local governments to be 
corrupt as an experimental effort; if the BPK found the corruption, they only need to 
return the state losses, however, if BPK did not find the case, they will gain benefits from 
the experiment.  
(3) Rationalisation 
Denial of responsibility has been the most often used reason to justify local leader’s 
corrupt behaviour. According to Anand et al. (2004), denial of responsibility is an 
excusing tactic in which corrupt perpetrators persuade themselves that they have no 
choice other than doing the unethical acts in exercising their authority, especially when 
the pressure is massive, because the others also do the same way (pp. 42-43). By assuming 
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that the high political cost of election has put an equal level of pressure among local 
leaders to recover the costs as well as to serve the contributors’ interests, corruption 
becomes an inseparable part of the decentralisation system. According to Prabowo 
(2014), when corruption is perceived as a normal conduct in a system, it become 
circumstances in rationalising corrupt behaviour (p. 317). The Corruption Eradication 
Commission reveals that during 2004-2012, the abuse of power by local leaders 
accounted for 81 percent of corruption cases, while the other 13 percent was about bribery 
(Rastika 2014). Because the abuse of power dominated the cases, it could be said that 
most of local leaders perceived it as normal conduct by local leaders since the others also 
do the similar violation. A theory of differential association introduced by Sutherland 
(1947, cited in Cressey 1954, p. 29) could be an explanation of how perpetrators 
rationalise their corrupt actions. According to this theory, individuals learn and imitate 
technique, rationalisation and motive of a criminal offense through a process of 
interactions and observations from previous offenders (ibid).  
In addition, the corrupt justice system also contributes to become a rationalisation for 
local officials to behave corruptly. Bertelsmann Stiftung (2016) in Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 2016 for Indonesia describes that Indonesia’s police and the 
judiciary are corrupt in which bribes could easily influence the results of judicial 
processes, starting from enforcement and investigation by the police, prosecution by the 
prosecutors, and decision of verdicts and appeals by the judges (p. 9). In addition, surveys 
conducted by Transparency International (TI) in 2013 have placed Indonesia’s National 
Police as the most corrupt institution in Indonesia and even in South East Asia, while 
Indonesia’s judiciary institutions are perceived corrupt by 52 percent of Indonesians 
surveyed by the TI in 2012 (TI 2012, p. 3; TI 2013, p. 17; pp. 35-38). Pepys (2007) argues 
that a perception about corrupt law enforcement agencies would increase the confidence 
of perpetrators to be more corrupt as they are convinced that penalty can be avoided by 
bribing these agencies (p. 3). This background is in line with Klitgaard’s (2008) argument 
about economic crime of corruption (p. 3), because rationalisation is matter by which 
perpetrators calculate the benefit to behave corruptly against the probability to avoid 
penalties.  
For instance, there was an interesting case of Regent of Subang Regency, West Java, who 
has bribed the prosecutors to free him from prosecution in April 2016.  Initially, the West 
Java High Prosecution office named the regent as one of individuals who committed in a 
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corruption case of social security funds which caused an equivalent to AU$ 470,000 of 
state losses (Halim 2016). At the initial stage of investigation, the regent allegedly bribed 
two prosecutors by AU$ 53,000 to clean his name from the case, however the KPK has 
been able to arrest the regent and two prosecutors when they were transacting the bribes 
at the prosecutors’ office (Gabrillin 2016b). This case was only one of the few cases of 
bribery of law enforcement agencies by local leaders which has been handled by the KPK 
because of its limited capacity to monitor more than 500 regions in Indonesia. Even 
though it cannot be generalised that all local police, prosecutors and judges are corrupt, 
the other cases which were not revealed by the KPK will remain unexposed and become 
a further rationalisation factor for local corrupt offenders.  
Conclusion 
In short, the triangle of fraud provides a framework to systematically analyse corruption 
in Indonesia’s decentralisation system by explaining relation of perpetrators’ non-
shareable pressure, perceived opportunity and rationalisation to engage in corrupt 
activities. First, financial pressure resulted from direct elections has forced the local 
leaders and parliament members to obtain political benefit which in turn becomes political 
corruption when they have to undermine the legal procedures in serving the contributors’ 
interests. Secondly, the weakness of the regulations systematically raises an opportunity 
for local leaders to monopoly powers and authorities at local level as well as to establish 
a collusion between executive and local parliament to jointly monopolise the power by 
obstructing the control mechanism, therefore each institution could not be functioning as 
mandated by law. In addition, the gap in the accountability mechanism encourages local 
leaders to experiment in corruption. Finally, since corruption cases involving local leaders 
are growing and becoming common conduct in the system, the others would rationalise 
their actions by imitating technique and motivation of previous perpetrators. Furthermore, 
the corrupt justice system also becomes a rationalisation factor by which perpetrators 
calculate the benefits of engaging corruption and opportunity to evade penalties. 
 
  9 
References 
Aisyah, S 2007, ‘The effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth’, ISS 
Research Paper, Institute of Social Studies, Graduate School of Development Studies, 
The Hague, viewed 26 September 2016,                          
< https://thesis.eur.nl/pub/6735/Siti%20Aisyah%20ECD.pdf>.  
 
Akuntono, I 2015, ‘Mendagri usulkan gaji kepala daerah diatas Rp 50 juta (Minister of 
Internal Affairs proposed local leaders’ salary above Rp 50 million)’, Kompas.com 
(online edition), 4 August 2015, viewed 29 September 2016,                                           
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/08/04/09545711/Mendagri.Usulkan.Gaji.Kepal
a.Daerah.di.Atas.Rp.50.Juta>.  
 
Anand, V, Ashford, BE & Joshi, M 2004, ‘Business as usual: The acceptance and 
perpetuation of corruption in organizations’, Academy of Management Executive, vol. 
18, no. 2, pp. 39-53. 
 
Angga, D 2014, ‘3169 anggota DPRD terkena kasus korupsi (3169 local parliament 
members are involved corruption), Sindonews.com (online edition), 12 August 2014, 
viewed 30 September 2016,                 
< http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/890578/13/3-169-anggota-dprd-terkena-kasus-
korupsi-1407855021>.  
 
Arikan, GG 2004, ‘Fiscal decentralization: a remedy for corruption?’, International Tax 
and Public Finance, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 175-195. 
 
Asthana, AN 2012, ‘Decentralisation and corruption revisited: evidence from a natural 
experiment’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 27-37. 
 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016, BTI 2016: Indonesia country report, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Gutersloh, viewed 3 October 2016,                 
< https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/> 
 
Byars, N 2009, ‘The corruption triangle’, CEE Working Paper, The Center for Ethics 
and Entrepreneurship, No. 6, Rockford, viewed 27 September 2016,                                
< http://www.ethicsandentrepreneurship.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Byars-
2009.pdf>. 
 
Cressey, DR 1954, ‘Diﬀerential association theory and compulsive crimes’, Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 29-40. 
 
Cressey, DR 1973, Others people’s money: a study in the social psychology of 
embezzlement, Patterson Smith, Monclair, New Jersey. 
 
DFAT, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016, Fraud control and anti-corruption plan, 
viewed 27 September 2016, < http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/fraud-
control-anti-corruption-plan.pdf>. 
 
 
  10 
Dorminey, J, Fleming, AS, Kranacher, MJ & Riley Jr, RA 2012, ‘The evolution of fraud 
theory’, Issues in Accounting Education, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 555-579. 
 
Fan, CS, Lin, C & Treisman, D 2009, ‘Political decentralization and corruption: evidence 
from around the world’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 14-34. 
 
Gabrillin, A 2016a, ‘KPK tetapkan 7 anggota DPRD Sumut sebagai tersangka suap 
(KPK has stated 7 North Sumatera’s parliament members as suspects to bribery case), 
Kompas.com (online edition), 17 Juni 2016, viewed 1 October 2016,                               
<http://regional.kompas.com/read/2016/06/17/05533181/kpk.tetapkan.7.anggota.dprd.s
umut.sebagai.tersangka.suap>. 
 
Gabrillin, A 2016b, ‘Tak ingin diungkap dalam korupsi BPJS, alasan Bupati Subang 
suap jaksa (Did not want to be revealed in the corruption case of social security funds, 
the reason why the Regent of Subang bribed the prosecutors), Kompas.com (online 
edition), 12 April 2016, viewed 3 October 2016,                                                                
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/04/12/15345371/Tak.Ingin.Diungkap.dalam.Ko
rupsi.BPJS.Alasan.Bupati.Subang.Suap.Jaksa>. 
 
General Elections Commissions Regulation Number 8 Year 2015 on Campaign Funds 
of Candidates of Local Leaders (Republic of Indonesia). 
 
Halim, H 2016, ‘KPK promises more crackdowns on bribery-riddled prosecutor’s 
offices’, 13 April 2016, viewed 4 October 2016, 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/04/13/kpk-promises-more-crackdowns-
bribery-riddled-prosecutor-s-offices.html>. 
 
Hidayat, A 2016, ‘Saksi: seluruh anggota DPRD Sumut terima suap dari Gatot 
(Witness: all North Sumatera’s parliament members have received bribery from Gatot), 
Tempo.co (online edition), 13 April 2016, viewed 1 October 2016, 
<https://m.tempo.co/read/news/2016/04/13/078762350/saksi-seluruh-anggota-dprd-
sumut-terima-suap-dari-gatot>.   
 
Hidayatullah, A 2016, ‘KPK: Sebanyak 361 Kepala Daerah Terlibat Korupsi (KPK: 361 
local leaders were involved corruption)’, Suara.com (online edition), 11 August 2016, 
viewed 26 September 2016,                    
<http://www.suara.com/news/2016/08/11/054655/kpk-sebanyak-361-kepala-daerah-
terlibat-korupsi>.  
 
Huther, J & Shah, A 1998, ‘Applying a simple measure of good governance to the debate 
on fiscal decentralization’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1894, World 
Bank, Washington DC, viewed 27 September 2016,                                          
< http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/wps1894.pdf>.  
 
Jumadi, J, Pudjiharjo, M, Maski, G & Khusaini, M 2013, ’The impact of fiscal 
decentralization on local economic development in East Java’ IOSR Journal of 
Humanities and Social Science, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-7. 
 
Kirana, G 2014, ‘Decentralization dilemma in Indonesia: does decentralization breed 
corruption?’ ISP Collection Paper, No. 1984, Independent Study Project, School for 
International Training (SIT) International Studies and Multilateral Diplomacy, Geneva, 
viewed 28 September 2016,  < http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1984/>. 
  11 
Klitgaard, R 1998, ‘International cooperation against corruption’, Finance and 
Development’ vol. 35, no.1, pp. 3-6. 
 
Klitgaard, R 2008, ‘A holistic approach to the fight against corruption’, paper presented 
to the Second Session of the Conference of State Parties to the United Nations 
Convention against Anti‐Corruption, Bali, Indonesia, 12 January 2008, 
<http://www.cgu.edu/PDFFiles/Presidents%20Office/Holistic_Approach_1-08.pdf>.  
 
KPK, see Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi. 
 
Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 2016, ‘Laporan studi potensi benturan kepentingan 
dalam pendanaan pilkada (Report of a study on potential of conflict of interest in direct 
election at local areas)’, Corruption Eradication Commission, viewed 28 September 
2016, 
<http://acch.kpk.go.id/documents/10180/15049/Laporan+Studi+Potensi+Benturan+Kep
entingan+dalam+Pendanaan+Pilkada.pdf/5992b55a-91ef-4976-bab6-44f54d28baa9>.  
 
Law 15/2004 on The State Financial Management and Accountability (Republic of 
Indonesia).  
 
Law 31/1999 as amended by Law 20/2001 Concerning Eradication of the Criminal Act 
of Corruption (Republic of Indonesia). 
 
Law 32/2004 on Local Government (Republic Indonesia). 
 
Muhtadi, B 2015, ‘Money politics and the prisoner’s dilemma’, New Mandala, viewed 
28 September 2016, <http://www.newmandala.org/money-politics-and-the-prisoners-
dilemma/>. 
 
Novoselov, K 2007, ‘Internal controls and collusion’, Doctoral Thesis, The University 
of Texas at Austin, Austin, viewed 30 September 2016,                                                    
< http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/accounting/papers/novoselov.pdf>. 
 
Pepinsky, TB & Wihardja MM 2011, ‘Decentralization and economic performance in 
Indonesia’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 337-371. 
 
Pepys, MN 2007, ‘Corruption within the judiciary: causes and remedies’, in 
Transparency International, Global corruption report 2007: corruption in judicial 
systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3-11. 
 
Prabowo, HY 2014, ‘To be corrupt or not to be corrupt: understanding the behavioural 
side of corruption in Indonesia’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 17, no. 3, 
pp. 306-326. 
 
Rachman, T 2014, ‘Kemendagri: 318 kepala daerah tersangkut korupsi (Minitry of 
Internal Affairs: 318 local leaders were involved corruption), Republika.co.id (online 
edition), 14 February 2014, viewed 30 September 2016,                                                  
< http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/14/02/14/n0zbwv-kemendagri-
318-kepala-daerah-tersangkut-korupsi>.  
 
 
  12 
Rastika, I 2014, ‘KPK: tak ada kaitan langsung korupsi kepala daerah dengan pilkada 
langsung (KPK: there is no direct relation between corruption and direct election), 
Kompas.com (online edition), 25 September 2014, viewed 2 October 2016,                      
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/09/25/15082951/kpk.tak.ada.kaitan.langsung.ko
rupsi.kepala.daerah.dengan.pilkada.langsung>.  
 
Rinaldi, T, Purnomo, M & Damayanti, D 2007, ‘Fighting corruption in decentralized 
Indonesia: case studies on handling local government corruption’ World Bank Working 
Paper, World Bank Jakarta Office, Jakarta, viewed 26 September 2016, 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/FightingCorruptioni
nDecentralizedIndonesia.pdf>. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, S 1999, ‘Political corruption and democracy’, Journal of International 
Law, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 363-378. 
 
Sjafrina, A, Widoyoko, JD & Abid, L 2013, ‘Menguras bumi, merebut kursi (Exploiting 
the earth, fighting for the chair)’ ICW Research Report, Indonesia Corruption Watch, 
Jakarta, viewed 30 September 2016,  
<http://www.antikorupsi.org/sites/antikorupsi.org/files/doc/Kajian/policybriefrisetpatro
nasebisnispolitikdandeforestasi.pdf>. 
 
Sjahrir, BS, Kis-Katos, K & Schulze, GG 2014, ‘Administrative overspending in 
indonesian districts: the role of local politics’, World Development, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 
16-183.  
 
Thompson, DF 2013, ‘Two concepts of corruption’, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, 
No. 16, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, Massachusetts, viewed 
29 September 2016,                    
< https://wattlecourses.anu.edu.au/mod/book/view.php?id=636446>. 
 
TI, see Transparency International 
 
Transparency International 2012, ‘Causes of corruption in Indonesia’, Transparency 
International, viewed 2 October 2016,                                                                                      
<http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/338_Causes_of_corruption_i
n_Indonesia.pdf>. 
 
Transparency International 2013, ‘Global corruption barometer 2013’, Transparency 
International, viewed 2 October 2016,                                                                                         
< https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report>. 
 
Wolfe, DT & Hermanson, DR 2004, ‘The fraud diamond: considering the four elements 
of fraud’, The CPA Journal, vol. 72, no 12, pp. 38-42. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
